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Thomas Aquinas 
On the Mixture of the Elements, to 
Master Philip of Castrocaeli1 
 
It is customarily a point of doubt among many people how the ele-5 
ments exist in a mixed [body]. 
[Avicenna’s Theory2] 
Now it seems to some that when the active and passive qualities of the 
elements are somehow reduced to an intermediate through alteration, the sub-
stantial forms of the elements remain. For if they do not remain, there will 10 
seem to be a kind of corruption of the elements and not a mixture. 
Again, if the substantial form of a mixed body is the act of matter 
without presupposing the forms of simple bodies, then the simple bodies of 
the elements will lose their definition (rationem). For an element is that of 
which something is primarily composed, and exists in it and is indivisible ac-15 
cording to species. But if the substantial forms [of the elements] are taken 
away, the mixed body will no longer be composed of simple bodies in such a 
way that they remain in it. 
But it is impossible for this [view] to be so. For it is impossible for 
matter to take on diverse forms of the elements in the same way. If therefore 20 
the substantial forms of the elements are going to be preserved in a mixed 
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body, it will be necessary for them to inhere in different parts of matter. Now 
it is impossible to get diverse parts of matter without quantity’s being already 
understood in the matter. For if quantity is taken away, the indivisible sub-
stance remains, as is clear from Physics I [3 185b16].3 But a physical body is 25 
constituted out of matter, existing under quantity, and an advening substantial 
form. Therefore, the diverse parts of matter, subsisting through the forms of 
the elements, take on the aspect (rationem) of several bodies. Now it is impos-
sible for [a physical body] to be many bodies at once. Therefore, the four ele-
ments will not exist in each part of the mixed body. And so [if they do exist,] 30 
there will not be a true mixture but [only a mixture] according to sensation, as 
happens when bodies come together that are insensible because of their small-
ness. 
Furthermore, every substantial form requires a proper disposition in 
matter, without which it cannot exist. Hence alteration is the way to genera-35 
tion and corruption. Now it is impossible for the proper disposition that is re-
quired for the form of fire and that which is required for the form of water to 
come together in the same thing. For fire and water are contraries in accord-
ance with such dispositions; but it is impossible for contraries to be in exactly 
the same thing at once. Therefore, it is impossible that the substantial forms of 40 
fire and water should be in the same part of the mixed [body]. Therefore, if 
the mixed [body] should come to be while the substantial forms of the simple 
bodies remain, it follows that it is not a true mixture but only [a mixture] for 
sensation when the parts, insensible because of their smallness, are as it were 
placed next to one another. 45 
[Averroes’ Theory4] 
But some people, wishing to avoid both these arguments, fell into an 
even greater inconsistency. For in order to distinguish a mixture from a cor-
ruption of the elements, they said that the substantial forms of the elements do 
remain in the mixed [body] somehow. But again, in order not to be compelled 50 
to say it is a mixture [only] for sensation and not in truth, they claimed that the 
forms of the elements do not remain in their fullness in the mixed [body], but 
are reduced to a certain intermediate. For they say that the forms of the ele-
ments admit of more and less and have a contrariety toward one another. But 
since this is plainly inconsistent with the common view and with the state-55 
ments of Aristotle, who says in the Categories [5 3b24 & 3b33–34] that noth-
ing is the contrary of substance, and that it does not admit of more and less, 
[therefore] they go further and say that the forms of the elements are the most 
imperfect inasmuch as they are closer to prime matter. Hence they are inter-
mediate between substantial and accidental forms. And so, insofar as they ap-60 
proach the nature of accidental forms they can admit of more and less. 
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Now this position can be refuted in many ways. First, because it is en-
tirely impossible for there to be anything intermediate between substance and 
accident; it would be something intermediate between affirmation and nega-
tion. For it is peculiar to an accident that it be in a subject, but to a substance 65 
that it not be in a subject. Now substantial forms are in matter, to be sure, but 
not in a subject. For a subject is a “this something.” A substantial form, on the 
other hand, is what makes a “this something”. But it does not presuppose it. 
Again, it is ridiculous to say there is an intermediate between things 
that are not in one genus, as is proved in Metaphysics X [9 1057a19–20 & 70 
1057a33–b1]. For an intermediate and its extremes must be in the same genus. 
Therefore, nothing can be an intermediate between substance and accident. 
Next, it is impossible for the substantial forms of the elements to admit 
of more and less. For every form admitting of more and less is divisible acci-
dentally, insofar namely as a subject can participate [in] it either more or less. 75 
But there can be continuous motion with respect to what is divisible [either] 
by itself or accidentally, as is clear in Physics VI [5 234b10–20]. For there is 
change of location, and increase and decrease with respect to quantity and 
place, which are by themselves divisibles, while there is alteration with re-
spect to qualities that admit of more and less, like hot and white. Therefore if 80 
the forms of the elements admit of more and less, both the generation and the 
corruption of the elements will be a continuous motion, which is impossible. 
For there is no continuous motion except in three categories, namely, quantity, 
quality and place, as is proved in Physics V [3–4 225b7–9  & 226a24–b10].  
Furthermore, every difference in substantial form varies the species. 85 
But [as for] what admits of more and less, what is more differs from what is 
less, and is in a certain way contrary to it, like more white and less white. 
Therefore if the form of fire admits of more and less, [then] when it is made 
more or made less it will vary the species and [will] not be the same form but 
another one. This is why the Philosopher says in Metaphysics VIII [3 1043b36–90 
1044a2] that just as among numbers the species is varied by addition and sub-
traction, so among substances. 
[Aquinas’ Own Theory] 
Therefore, we must find another way whereby a true mixture will be 
kept intact and yet the elements not be totally corrupted but somehow remain 95 
in the mixed [body]. Thus we must consider that the active and passive quali-
ties of the elements are contraries to one another and admit of more and less. 
Now from contrary qualities admitting of more and less an intermediate quali-
ty can be constituted that may have the flavor of the nature of both extremes, 
like pale between white and black and tepid between hot and cold. So there-100 
fore, when the perfections (excellentiis) of the elementary qualities are re-
laxed, a kind of intermediate quality is constituted out of them that is the 
proper quality of the mixed body, yet differs in diverse [mixed bodies] accord-
ing to the diverse proportion of the mixture. And this quality is the disposition 
4 
proper to the form of the mixed body, just as a simple quality [is] to the form 105 
of a simple body. Therefore, just as the extremes are found in the intermedi-
ate, which participates [in] the nature of both, so the qualities of simple bodies 
are found in the proper quality of a mixed body. Now of course the quality of 
a simple body is other than its substantial form. Nevertheless, it acts in virtue 
of the substantial form. Otherwise heat would only make [something] hot, but 110 
the substantial form [for which heat is the proper disposition in matter] would 
not be drawn into act through [heat’s] power, since nothing acts outside its 
species. 
So therefore the powers of the substantial forms of simple bodies are 
preserved in mixed bodies. Thus the forms of the elements are in mixed [bod-115 
ies] not actually but virtually. And this is what Aristotle says in On Genera-
tion I [10 327b29–31]: “Therefore they do not remain actually — that is, the el-
ements in the mixed [body] — as body and white do. Neither is either or both 
of them corrupted. For their power is preserved.” 
